The Contrarians' Review
An Online Journal of Ideas and Controversy. Published By Flying Ostrich Press. John F. Triolo, Editor.
The Success of Legalism in Warring States China
John F. Triolo is the Editor-in-Chief of The Contrarians' Review
By John F. Triolo
The “Warring States” period in Chinese history was one in which tremendous chaos and violence ruled the day. Competition between the kings of the various fragmented states that emerged from the Zhou fiefdoms was fierce and often bloodthirsty. The intense struggles for power among and inside these kingdoms led to great hardship for the common people and gross inadequacy and inefficiency in government. The quest to bring order to societies that seemed to be run more by the caprice of fate than rational men or institutions led to the creation of numerous philosophical systems with idealistic and moralizing themes, often emphasizing the importance of a strong civil society. Among these systems were those that came to be known to Westerners as Confucianism and Daoism. However, despite the enormous impact which these subsequently had on Chinese society (particularly in the Han Empire 1), neither was sufficient to cope with the conditions existing during the violent and unpredictable Warring States period. The only political philosophy with the necessary vigor, strength and brutal pragmatism to work in the ongoing chaos proved to the totalitarian system now known in English as Legalism.
There are several reasons that Legalism, with its rigorous and often shockingly inhuman, restrictions, intellectual intolerance, intra-governmental strife and dangerously centralizing tendencies was uniquely well suited to succeed in the Warring States period when it would and in fact, did, fail in a period of greater stability and prosperity.2 These include harsh uniform laws, ruthless centralization and, most importantly, the absolute power and sovereignty of the monarch. With these theoretical tools, seemingly unsuited for most times and most governments, Legalism built the empire which unified China.
The harshness and uniform application of the laws proposed by Legalism was one of the system’s greatest strengths. The Warring States period was one of increased and increasing turmoil; turmoil tending to weaken the control of the king and the strength of the State. Any kind of long-term social turmoil has a necessarily deleterious effect on the social controls of shame, hierarchy and ritual which social and political philosophies such as those conceived by Confucians like Mencius and Xunzi.3 These principles draw their authority from natural law. The specific institutions which embody them, however, are legitimated by tradition, not force of law or coercion. Furthermore, they gain their power through a quasi-Weberian process which is heavily reliant on the long-term habituation of the people to them. In the world of rapidly changing technology, political economy and warfare that existed during the Warring States Period, time was often the most precious of resources. In addition, Legalists like Han Fei understood that there are always those who refuse to be governed by good influences; “People by nature grow proud on love, but they obey authority.” 4 Confucian thought simply did not account for how improper behavior might be dealt with when it occurs on a large scale and traditional institutions are weak. Here then is revealed the strength of the Legalists. In a world of rigid de jure regulation and swift and sure punishment for all infractions, be they ever so minor, there is no need, indeed, no room, for the subtle niceties of tradition. Fear itself proves sufficient for the establishment and short-term maintenance of order. In the Qin state under legalism, for example, punishments started at hard labor, graduated to mutilation and finished at serious offenders being pulled apart by chariots.5 To see to it that the law was followed, households and families were held responsible for each other and subject to a similar punishment to whoever have actually committed the infraction.6 The atmosphere of terror, almost like an ancient police state, must have been pervasive and emotionally suffocating. It must also have been highly effective as a tool for securing order.
Like terror, simplicity and predictability were watchwords for Legalists in designing policies designed to secure order. In the words of Han Fei:
The rigid legal system, combined with the attendant harsh punishments, though brutal, did provide the tools necessary to bring order to one of the Warring States kingdoms and enable that kingdom, the Qin state, to more effectively project its power beyond its borders.
Centralization was another tremendously important aspect of the Legalist program, one which provided a Legalist government with advantages uniquely powerful in the Warring States period. On the surface it would seem that in a place as large diverse and (at least in the Warring States period) fragmented as China the best government would be designed in a semi-feudal style which took into account the complexities of regional identity. Normally, this would probably be a safe assumption. However, during the Warring States period the culture was suffering from an excess of unmediated regionalism and factionalism that had developed under the feudal Zhou Empire.8 To allow this regionalism to survive in this (one is tempted to say “any) form would be potentially fatal to any new regime. Legalist centralism, while heavy handed and sometimes ill-suited to particular local realities, helped to weaken or eliminate political loyalties other than those to the State and the Legalist order. Centralism also provided governments and added advantage by helping the Legalists define all endeavors as worthwhile solely in terms of the usefulness to the State. In a world where the government is at the center of all things in society, the Legalist ruler and ministers may create their dream state, wherein:
Centralism was pursued by Legalists not out of some mindless ideological devotion to regularity but rather out of real, down-to-earth pragmatic concerns about the disparate and shifting loyalties of subjects in the Warring States. In turning to hyper-centralization as a solution, as men like Li Si eventually did in Qin, Legalists arrived at a short term correction to a long term problem.
The final major aspect of Legalism which fitted it to triumph in the Warring States period is the absolute power and sovereignty of the king in the Legalist State. Sovereignty is obviously a Western concept that does not perfectly translate to the context of Warring States China, but there are very important connections to the Legalist conception of kingship. Legalist kingship is closer to early modern absolutism or theories of the Divine Right of Sovereigns than it is to the theoretical legitimacy of rulers being based on the so-called “Mandate of Heaven” which prevailed in later Chinese monarchies. The writings of the prominent Legalist theorists clearly construct the king as the only legitimate source of legal authority in a kingdom, as is demonstrated in various texts explaining to ministers how they ought to manage the ruler. Managed though he may be, a ruler in the ideal Legalists State is absolute and only he can cause any movement in the machinery of government. This was perfectly suited to the designs of Legalists in the Warring States because after creating efficient and rigid bureaucracies, the Legalists limited the number of people who could disrupt the efficiency of their administration to one. The technical and philosophical advantaged of absolute sovereignty do not end here, however. The theoretical autocrat of the legalist system also provides a totem and symbol for the State. He serves as a focus for the loyalty of the people. Even a weak or foolish king is valuable as the visible source of authority. He is a person so removed and remote that he seems as great in the perceptions of his subjects as they must seem to an ant. This is why, as is shown in the outcomes of conflicts between Qin ministers like Han Fei and Li Si, the king of a Legalist state must never be blamed for mistake.10 A minister must always be scapegoated to preserve the myth of the all-wise ruler limited only by the incompetence of his subjects.
Armed with systemic advantages not enjoyed by any other school of political philosophy existing in China during the Warring States period, Legalism eventually did triumph and become dominate. The Legalist Qin state rapidly expanded until its ruler was the undisputed ruler of China. No other state was vibrant or strong enough to resist the efficiency and ruthlessness of the Legalist regime. The irony of this success is that in imposing order on the chaotic Warring States, Chinese Legalism eliminated the very conditions which had allowed it to succeed so rapidly. Legalism provided a cure for the disease of chaos which had become epidemic during the Zhou Empire but as with any medicine, the elimination of the illness does away with the need for a cure. By the doctrine’s very success did it make itself obsolete. The Legalist Qin Empire lasted only through two monarchs before it was overthrown by the Han who set up a Confucian model for their government.11 During the Warring States the Chinese people needed the order and unity which Legalism could provide. Once order was restored and an empire built however, the chaffing and tyrannical yoke of the Legalist was thrown off in favor of a State which probably could not have succeeded absent the conditions provided by successful Legalism.
-------------------------------
Notes:
1Patricia Buckley Ebrey et al. East Asia; A Cultural, Social and Political History (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 49.
2 Ibid, 48.
3 Han Fei, quoted in: William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. 1, From the Earliest Times to 1600, 2nd edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 160.
4 Ibid., 199.
5 Ebrey, East Asia, 47.
6 Ibid., 46.
7 de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 211.
8 Ebrey, East Asia, 38.
9 de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 214.
10 Professor Susan Fernsebner, Lecture, 20 September 2006 at University of Mary Washington.
11 Ebrey, East Asia, 49.
The “Warring States” period in Chinese history was one in which tremendous chaos and violence ruled the day. Competition between the kings of the various fragmented states that emerged from the Zhou fiefdoms was fierce and often bloodthirsty. The intense struggles for power among and inside these kingdoms led to great hardship for the common people and gross inadequacy and inefficiency in government. The quest to bring order to societies that seemed to be run more by the caprice of fate than rational men or institutions led to the creation of numerous philosophical systems with idealistic and moralizing themes, often emphasizing the importance of a strong civil society. Among these systems were those that came to be known to Westerners as Confucianism and Daoism. However, despite the enormous impact which these subsequently had on Chinese society (particularly in the Han Empire 1), neither was sufficient to cope with the conditions existing during the violent and unpredictable Warring States period. The only political philosophy with the necessary vigor, strength and brutal pragmatism to work in the ongoing chaos proved to the totalitarian system now known in English as Legalism.
There are several reasons that Legalism, with its rigorous and often shockingly inhuman, restrictions, intellectual intolerance, intra-governmental strife and dangerously centralizing tendencies was uniquely well suited to succeed in the Warring States period when it would and in fact, did, fail in a period of greater stability and prosperity.2 These include harsh uniform laws, ruthless centralization and, most importantly, the absolute power and sovereignty of the monarch. With these theoretical tools, seemingly unsuited for most times and most governments, Legalism built the empire which unified China.
The harshness and uniform application of the laws proposed by Legalism was one of the system’s greatest strengths. The Warring States period was one of increased and increasing turmoil; turmoil tending to weaken the control of the king and the strength of the State. Any kind of long-term social turmoil has a necessarily deleterious effect on the social controls of shame, hierarchy and ritual which social and political philosophies such as those conceived by Confucians like Mencius and Xunzi.3 These principles draw their authority from natural law. The specific institutions which embody them, however, are legitimated by tradition, not force of law or coercion. Furthermore, they gain their power through a quasi-Weberian process which is heavily reliant on the long-term habituation of the people to them. In the world of rapidly changing technology, political economy and warfare that existed during the Warring States Period, time was often the most precious of resources. In addition, Legalists like Han Fei understood that there are always those who refuse to be governed by good influences; “People by nature grow proud on love, but they obey authority.” 4 Confucian thought simply did not account for how improper behavior might be dealt with when it occurs on a large scale and traditional institutions are weak. Here then is revealed the strength of the Legalists. In a world of rigid de jure regulation and swift and sure punishment for all infractions, be they ever so minor, there is no need, indeed, no room, for the subtle niceties of tradition. Fear itself proves sufficient for the establishment and short-term maintenance of order. In the Qin state under legalism, for example, punishments started at hard labor, graduated to mutilation and finished at serious offenders being pulled apart by chariots.5 To see to it that the law was followed, households and families were held responsible for each other and subject to a similar punishment to whoever have actually committed the infraction.6 The atmosphere of terror, almost like an ancient police state, must have been pervasive and emotionally suffocating. It must also have been highly effective as a tool for securing order.
Like terror, simplicity and predictability were watchwords for Legalists in designing policies designed to secure order. In the words of Han Fei:
The best rewards are those that are generous and predictable so that the people might profit by them. The best penalties are those that are severe and inescapable, so that people will fear them. The best laws are those that uniform and inflexible, so that the people can understand them.7
The rigid legal system, combined with the attendant harsh punishments, though brutal, did provide the tools necessary to bring order to one of the Warring States kingdoms and enable that kingdom, the Qin state, to more effectively project its power beyond its borders.
Centralization was another tremendously important aspect of the Legalist program, one which provided a Legalist government with advantages uniquely powerful in the Warring States period. On the surface it would seem that in a place as large diverse and (at least in the Warring States period) fragmented as China the best government would be designed in a semi-feudal style which took into account the complexities of regional identity. Normally, this would probably be a safe assumption. However, during the Warring States period the culture was suffering from an excess of unmediated regionalism and factionalism that had developed under the feudal Zhou Empire.8 To allow this regionalism to survive in this (one is tempted to say “any) form would be potentially fatal to any new regime. Legalist centralism, while heavy handed and sometimes ill-suited to particular local realities, helped to weaken or eliminate political loyalties other than those to the State and the Legalist order. Centralism also provided governments and added advantage by helping the Legalists define all endeavors as worthwhile solely in terms of the usefulness to the State. In a world where the government is at the center of all things in society, the Legalist ruler and ministers may create their dream state, wherein:
Officials serve as the only teachers…cutting off the heads of the enemy is the only deed of valor…when people make a speech they say nothing in contradiction of the law; when they act it is in some way that will bring useful results; and when they do brave deeds they do them in the army. Therefore in times of peace the State is rich and in times of war its armies are strong.9
Centralism was pursued by Legalists not out of some mindless ideological devotion to regularity but rather out of real, down-to-earth pragmatic concerns about the disparate and shifting loyalties of subjects in the Warring States. In turning to hyper-centralization as a solution, as men like Li Si eventually did in Qin, Legalists arrived at a short term correction to a long term problem.
The final major aspect of Legalism which fitted it to triumph in the Warring States period is the absolute power and sovereignty of the king in the Legalist State. Sovereignty is obviously a Western concept that does not perfectly translate to the context of Warring States China, but there are very important connections to the Legalist conception of kingship. Legalist kingship is closer to early modern absolutism or theories of the Divine Right of Sovereigns than it is to the theoretical legitimacy of rulers being based on the so-called “Mandate of Heaven” which prevailed in later Chinese monarchies. The writings of the prominent Legalist theorists clearly construct the king as the only legitimate source of legal authority in a kingdom, as is demonstrated in various texts explaining to ministers how they ought to manage the ruler. Managed though he may be, a ruler in the ideal Legalists State is absolute and only he can cause any movement in the machinery of government. This was perfectly suited to the designs of Legalists in the Warring States because after creating efficient and rigid bureaucracies, the Legalists limited the number of people who could disrupt the efficiency of their administration to one. The technical and philosophical advantaged of absolute sovereignty do not end here, however. The theoretical autocrat of the legalist system also provides a totem and symbol for the State. He serves as a focus for the loyalty of the people. Even a weak or foolish king is valuable as the visible source of authority. He is a person so removed and remote that he seems as great in the perceptions of his subjects as they must seem to an ant. This is why, as is shown in the outcomes of conflicts between Qin ministers like Han Fei and Li Si, the king of a Legalist state must never be blamed for mistake.10 A minister must always be scapegoated to preserve the myth of the all-wise ruler limited only by the incompetence of his subjects.
Armed with systemic advantages not enjoyed by any other school of political philosophy existing in China during the Warring States period, Legalism eventually did triumph and become dominate. The Legalist Qin state rapidly expanded until its ruler was the undisputed ruler of China. No other state was vibrant or strong enough to resist the efficiency and ruthlessness of the Legalist regime. The irony of this success is that in imposing order on the chaotic Warring States, Chinese Legalism eliminated the very conditions which had allowed it to succeed so rapidly. Legalism provided a cure for the disease of chaos which had become epidemic during the Zhou Empire but as with any medicine, the elimination of the illness does away with the need for a cure. By the doctrine’s very success did it make itself obsolete. The Legalist Qin Empire lasted only through two monarchs before it was overthrown by the Han who set up a Confucian model for their government.11 During the Warring States the Chinese people needed the order and unity which Legalism could provide. Once order was restored and an empire built however, the chaffing and tyrannical yoke of the Legalist was thrown off in favor of a State which probably could not have succeeded absent the conditions provided by successful Legalism.
-------------------------------
Notes:
1Patricia Buckley Ebrey et al. East Asia; A Cultural, Social and Political History (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 49.
2 Ibid, 48.
3 Han Fei, quoted in: William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. 1, From the Earliest Times to 1600, 2nd edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 160.
4 Ibid., 199.
5 Ebrey, East Asia, 47.
6 Ibid., 46.
7 de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 211.
8 Ebrey, East Asia, 38.
9 de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 214.
10 Professor Susan Fernsebner, Lecture, 20 September 2006 at University of Mary Washington.
11 Ebrey, East Asia, 49.
